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Interlopers, Rogues, or Cosmopolitans? Wu Jianzhang and Early Modern Commercial 
Networks on the China Coast 
 
Peter C. Perdue, Yale University 
 
Abstract 
 
After the First Opium War (1839–1842), British and American merchants negotiated with 
Chinese officials in Shanghai to work out the framework of the new treaty port regime. One key 
player in these negotiations was Wu Jianzhang, a Cantonese merchant who became circuit 
intendant of the Shanghai region. Wu, however, also had links to Cantonese sailors and anti-
Qing secret societies. When the Small Swords Society took Shanghai in 1853, he found himself 
entangled in conflicting responsibilities and networks. Foreign traders and Chinese officials 
regarded Wu, like other middlemen on the Chinese coast, with a mixture of respect and distrust. 
Wu’s situation, however, was not unique to the mid-nineteenth century. This article compares 
Wu to other intermediaries who played similar roles in the sixteenth and late nineteenth 
centuries, in order to show the ways in which Wu, his predecessors, and those who followed in 
his footsteps connected China to the wider world by navigating the treacherous waters of 
diplomacy, war, and commerce. The work of John K. Fairbank, who in the 1950s pioneered the 
study of such people as Wu Jianzhang, can find new meaning in the twenty-first century, 
enabling us to understand the transnational implications of China’s local social history. 
 
Keywords: Shanghai, Opium War, treaty ports, hong merchants, Canton, Fujian, Taiping 
rebellion, Small Swords Society, Qing dynasty, China coast, Wu Jianzhang 
 
Introduction 
 Wu Jianzhang (ca. 1810–1865), a Cantonese merchant who served as the daotai 道台
(circuit intendant) of Shanghai, barely survived the 1850s. At first he prospered, both politically 
and financially, due to his key position managing British and American merchant access to the 
port under the provisions of the treaties that settled the First Opium War. But when his 
Cantonese compatriot Liu Lichuan led the secret Small Swords Society (Xiaodaohui) to occupy 
Shanghai in 1853, Wu had to flee for protection to the International Settlement. While Shanghai 
was under siege by Qing forces, Wu aided the court by hiring foreign ships to suppress the 
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Taiping and Small Swords rebellions, but the court in Beijing impeached and exiled him to 
Xinjiang for failing to resist the Small Swords effectively and for having illicit business relations 
with the American firm Russell and Company. He was sentenced to deportation to Ili the next 
year, but because he had contributed his own funds to support the court, friends pleaded for 
mercy. By 1856, he had turned up again in Shanghai as an adviser to the American doctor Peter 
Parker, and by 1858, he had become the expectant circuit intendant. He appears to have remained 
in Shanghai until the end of his life (Leung 1990, 56). 
 This article describes, first, the entangled relationships between Wu Jianzhang and Liu 
Lichuan, two Cantonese men who played major roles in Shanghai during the 1850s. They came 
from the same hometown in Guangdong and encountered each other as business partners, 
negotiators, and supporters of armed men who fought battles on opposite sides of the walled city 
of Shanghai. Both had connections not only with Cantonese society and Shanghai merchants, but 
also with foreign merchants and officials and the Qing court. They occupied the vulnerable and 
open spaces in between rural society and the foreign traders of the treaty ports, and they took 
advantage of the opportunities that this intermediate position offered. Placed at a crucial node of 
global interactions in the mid-nineteenth century, Wu and Liu have much to tell us about China’s 
entry into the modern world. But they were neither the first nor the last Chinese who occupied 
this position. They had predecessors and, in turn, left legacies. After discussing the mid-
nineteenth-century events, I will extend my analysis to look at two other men who found 
themselves facing similar dilemmas at different times: Lin Xiyuan, a Fujianese gentryman 
prominent in the sixteenth century, and Wu Tingfang, a cosmopolitan merchant active in Hong 
Kong in the late nineteenth century. A comparison of the common patterns of such men and their 
networks helps us trace the long threads that have always tied China to the wider world. 
 
The Many Faces of Wu Jianzhang 
 Wu Jianzhang played a major role in negotiations with the British and Americans over 
levying customs duties in Shanghai. He also had business connections with the American firm 
Russell and Company and contacts with important guild merchants in Shanghai. In 1854, he 
negotiated with the British, American, and French consuls to create the Foreign Inspectorate of 
Customs, the precursor to the Imperial Maritime Customs, a major provider of revenue to the 
Qing government (Fairbank 1969, 440–443; van de Ven 2014). Wu also had close ties to a 
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fellow Cantonese, Liu Lichuan, with whom he had worked in business. When the Taiping 
threatened Shanghai, Wu tried to recruit Liu’s militiamen to defend the city. In 1853, the Small 
Swords Society, a branch of the Triad secret society, staged an uprising and occupied Shanghai 
from 1853 to 1855. After the Qing recovered the city, Wu continued to wield influence in 
Shanghai through the 1850s. 
 Wu was clearly a man involved in many networks at different levels of society, and he 
interacted with a diverse group of individuals, including foreigners, his fellow Cantonese, rebels 
against the Qing, and local officials. How was he able to connect so many diverse groups, and 
how did he juggle their competing interests? As his impeachment shows, his position was never 
secure: a sudden change in the power of one faction could damage his status and wreck his plans. 
But the fact that he managed to stay in an expectant or regular post of circuit intendant for nearly 
a decade demonstrates his value to his patrons. 
 Source material about the elusive Wu Jianzhang is rather scarce. The most revealing 
information about him comes from British letters in the Foreign Office archives and the 
documentary collection Chouban yiwu shimo, a compilation of sources on Qing foreign relations 
created by the Qing court from 1843 to 1875 and published in the 1930s (Chouban yiwu shimo 
1979; Wilkinson 2013, 828). Both foreign and Qing sources express frustration and bias against 
Wu and his confederates. The British consuls blamed Wu’s duplicity on his background in the 
Canton trade before he came to Shanghai.1 The Qing sources likewise criticize Wu as an 
unscrupulous wheeler-dealer who diverted customs funds into his own pockets and undermined 
Qing authority by failing to act against the Small Swords. He fit the court’s image of the 
insidious “Han traitor” (hanjian 汉奸), the kind of man who became too intimate with foreigners 
and rebels at the expense of imperial authority. 
 But Wu’s ties to the Cantonese secret society communities add even more complexity to 
his networks. He not only mediated between foreigners and the Shanghai merchant class; he also 
extended his reach into Cantonese lower-class society. When the Small Swords attacked 
Shanghai in 1853, he found himself caught between his multiple connections. He was forced to 
seek refuge in the International Settlement to gain protection from the rebels, and he bought 
ships to support the imperial forces in their battle against the Small Swords. But he could never 
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shake off an air of suspicion; both foreigners and the court believed he was profiting by playing 
different sides against one another. 
 More recent work on the Small Swords uprising has illuminated Wu from a different 
angle (Shanghai shehui kexueyuan 1964; Fass 1970). Social historians looking at the roots of 
conflict in the Qing have tried to uncover the underlying motivation of the Triad and Small 
Swords uprisings. People’s Republic of China (PRC) historians describe those who participated 
in these uprisings as anti-imperialist peasant rebels: “The Shanghai Small Swords uprising was a 
revolutionary military uprising by the people of Shanghai against imperialist aggression and 
Qing feudal rule. It was an important component of the Taiping revolutionary movement” 
(Shanghai shehui kexueyuan 1964, 5). Political scientist Elizabeth Perry, on the other hand, finds 
the uprising rooted in anti-tax resistance movements in the countryside around Shanghai, 
primarily motivated by resistance to Qing tax collectors (Perry 1985). Wu himself appears first 
as a figure trying to mobilize militia forces to put down the Small Swords and raise funds from 
his contacts among the merchant guilds of the city. He failed, however, because his militia forces 
deserted to the Small Swords, forcing him to take refuge in the International Settlement. 
 Foreigners viewed Wu from the outside, as a duplicitous but influential figure determined 
to limit their access to the Chinese market. The Beijing court came to see Wu as an 
untrustworthy agent of foreign powers, too closely allied with commercial interests to be a loyal 
official. Wu at first attracted the loyalty of Cantonese and Fujianese braves, who were willing to 
fight under his banner to defend Shanghai, but the Small Swords leaders eventually came to see 
him as a hostile representative of the Qing administration. Each of these perspectives reveals 
only one face of this multifaceted man. The man in between is always vulnerable to attack from 
many sides. Can we discover the “real” Wu Jianzhang in the midst of this welter of conflicting 
interpretations? 
 We can view Wu as foreigners did, from the outside in, or as the upper bureaucracy saw 
him, from the top down, or from the social historians’ lower depths looking up, but what if we 
view him from the middle, in his own terms? In this light, Wu belongs not only to the modern 
age of treaty ports, but also to a longer lineage of Chinese coastal merchant-officials who wove 
complex chains of intrigue, smuggling, militia organization, and official responsibility, going 
back at least to the Ming dynasty. If we place Wu Jianzhang in this Chinese lineage, we can 
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provide a more local view of his activities that goes beyond accusations of mere corruption, self-
seeking opportunism, or treason.  
 Ever since the late Ming dynasty, prominent Chinese of the southern coast had drawn on 
networks linking local society and foreign trade to engage in complex maneuvers of diplomacy, 
commerce, and war. After the mid-nineteenth century, other Chinese men obtained Western 
educations and continued this tradition of brokerage and mediation, trying to serve Chinese 
official, national, and foreign interests. They prospered because of their unusual skills at cultural 
brokerage, for a while. But they also found themselves in vulnerable positions, suspected by all 
sides of deception, disloyalty, and intrigue. As the consummate shapeshifters in the eyes of 
others, never considered completely trustworthy by anyone, they epitomize the dilemmas of 
many Chinese in the globalizing world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 Many large-scale overviews of global history give us a grand view of abstract processes 
shared by many parts of the world. They provide less information about the individuals whose 
actions made globalization happen (Rosenberg 2012; Iriye 2014; Osterhammel 2014). Ignoring 
quirky individuals, famous and obscure, makes globalization look like an inevitable linear 
process driven by irresistible economic and geopolitical forces. This perspective risks repeating 
the errors of the determinist, teleological Marxism that plagued historical study in the Maoist era. 
We need to recapture the contingency of historical change by linking local history to global 
developments. Biographies on a global scale, such as the works of Timothy Brook (2008), 
Natalie Z. Davis (2006), and John Wills (2001), represent one effective way to do this. The 
conclusion to this article develops some of the implications of this biographical approach for the 
global history of China.  
 
The Question of Wu 
 Wu Jianzhang came from Xiangshan, in Guangdong, and was a member of the Samqua 
hong merchant firm. He purchased the jiansheng examination degree and became acting 
intendant of the SuSongTai circuit in 1843. He became active in Shanghai by 1848 and took 
charge of foreign relations as superintendent of customs at Shanghai in 1851 (Hummel 1943–
1944, 865–866). Over the next two years, he clashed with the British over several trade issues, 
mainly because the British felt that he had not fairly enforced the collection of the tariff set by 
the treaties ending the Opium War. As described above, he fled to the International Settlement 
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when the Small Swords Society occupied the walled city. He was impeached and sentenced to 
deportation to Ili but returned to Shanghai as an official in 1858. 
 That, in brief, is Wu’s story. But what entitled him, an outsider to Shanghai with a low- 
level purchased degree, to such an important position, and what got him into so much trouble? 
From the court’s point of view, Wu had special skills that allowed him to deal firmly with 
foreign efforts to penetrate the Chinese market. He had learned some English during his time in 
Canton, so he could communicate directly with foreigners, avoiding dependence on their 
interpreters (Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 2.6b). He also demonstrated firmness, honesty, and 
resolve in resisting illegal activity by foreign merchants. When British silk merchants attempted 
to trade illegally in Huzhou and Taihu, he called in the British consul, insisting that he exert 
control over merchant infractions, and the consul called the merchants back. When the British 
hired Chinese laborers, who then stole 700 taels of silver and absconded, they asked the daotai 
for compensation. Wu replied that the British had failed to check on the laborers’ hometowns 
and failed to obtain guarantors; they had hired unreliable men (wu laili zhi ren 无来历之人), so 
the losses were their own fault. 
 Wu’s successor as daotai, Huang Zantang, cited Wu’s resolute position to support his 
case that direct, firm action by local officials could successfully ward off foreign penetration. He 
even compared Wu’s actions to those of Lin Zexu, the powerful official whose harsh policies 
against opium trafficking had incited the British to start the First Opium War. In Huang’s view, 
Lin’s policies of shutting down trade and burning opium had gained a victory. Wu also 
demonstrated resolve in the Qingpu affair of 1848, when British missionaries left Shanghai to 
preach in Qingpu, 40 kilometers southwest of Shanghai, beyond the restricted zone for 
foreigners. Local boatmen attacked them, but the local magistrate rescued them. British consul 
Sir Rutherford Alcock blocked the movement of 4,000 junks bringing grain tribute shipments to 
the capital in order to enforce his demand for compensation. Local officials resisted paying 
anything to the British, but when Wu arrived in Shanghai in 1848, he was able to arrange for the 
release of the grain tribute boats after the governor-general approved compensation (Fairbank 
1969, 395; Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 2.30b; Bergère 2009, 19). 
 Until the 1850s, then, Wu succeeded in serving the court in its efforts to tax the Shanghai 
trade while also keeping foreign activities under control. The foreign merchants paid him 
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grudging respect, finding him a useful intermediary, knowledgeable in commercial practices, 
who restricted their efforts to smuggle goods while also ensuring that trade was carried on with 
reasonable security.  
 
Liu Lichuan, the Cantonese Merchant-Rebel 
 Liu Lichuan rose to power in Shanghai by a different method. Born in Xiangshan in 
1820, Liu, like Wu, learned pidgin English after moving to Hong Kong. He joined the Triad 
Society there and then moved to Shanghai to work as an interpreter for a Western firm. Outside 
the city, in the same country town of Qingpu where the missionaries had trespassed, the local 
village headman (dibao) Zhou Lichun had led a protest to the county seat to plead for tax 
exemptions due to bad harvests. Zhou fought off the magistrate’s guards and established himself 
as an influential strongman. Zhou, the local strongman, and Liu, the ambitious immigrant, 
thereby created an alliance against Qing officials trying to enforce tax collection.  
 After the Taiping armies took Nanjing in March 1853, a group of Triads calling 
themselves the Small Swords Society occupied Xiamen. Wu Jianzhang assembled a militia corps 
comprising unemployed Cantonese and Fujianese dockworkers to defend Shanghai (Shanghai 
shehui kexueyuan 1964, 36). But he soon had to disband them due to a lack of funds and 
training. They then joined the local Triad groups under Liu Lichuan’s leadership. Zhou Lichun 
took the county seat of Jiading and, two days later (on Confucius’s birthday, September 7), Liu 
launched his attack on Shanghai. When the Small Swords groups took control of the Shanghai 
region, Wu sought protection from the foreign community. The British, declaring their neutrality 
in the war and fearing attacks by the Small Swords, refused to give sanctuary to Wu: 
 
With reference to this individual I have advised Mr. Alcock that, in my opinion, it 
would be imprudent to permit him again to take refuge in the Foreign settlement, 
for so long as he is suffered to reside under foreign protection, and there to 
concoct his schemes against the rebels, it cannot be affirmed that the British 
authorities are observing the strict neutrality which it is so desirable they should 
maintain, while his residence in the settlement might furnish the rebels with a 
plausible pretext for making a forcible entry into it for the purpose of capturing 
him. (Foreign Office, FO 176 17/205, 29) 
 
The Americans, however, gave him shelter in their compound until Wu left the city to organize 
resistance. 
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 Soon the Small Swords lost control of the countryside. Zhou Lichun was executed, but 
the rebels held out in the walled city of Shanghai (figure 1). They plundered the yamen treasury 
and confiscated wealth from rich residents of the city to support their army against siege by 
imperial troops. Liu Lichuan tried to negotiate a surrender of the city to Wu Jianzhang, but others 
resisted Liu’s peace offers. He was able to escape back to his home in Guangdong after the city 
fell to imperial forces on February 17, 1855 (Meadows [1856] 1953, 451). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The “Hall of Rising Spring” in the Yuyuan garden within the walled city of Shanghai 
served as the headquarters of the Small Swords Society when it occupied the city from 1853 to 
1855. Source: Zang (2005, 65). 
 
 However, the Small Swords were not simple peasant rebels. They also obtained foreign 
military support. The British consul and the American consul, who worked for Russell and 
Company, both sold weapons to them. Other Small Swords leaders had also worked for foreign 
firms. In a bid for Christian support, Liu told foreign missionaries that he had sent letters asking 
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for an alliance with the Taiping in Nanjing. Although Liu’s main ideology rested on restoring the 
Ming dynasty, not on any version of Christian beliefs, he was perfectly willing to draw in 
Christian Taiping and Western missionaries alike.  
 The Small Swords mobilization arose from the impact of treaty ports on the countryside 
of the lower Yangzi and southeast China. Such tax resistance movements originated in cash-
cropping districts near Shanghai: opium smugglers, merchant guilds, and foreign ideas supported 
the Small Swords (Perry 1985). In this tangle of events, all of the parties had complex 
connections with one another.  
 Since the Small Swords clearly made bids for foreign support, it makes little sense to 
interpret the struggle, as PRC historians do, as a polarized conflict between a peasant-led anti-
imperialist movement and foreign colonialists. Nor does Wu himself fit the stereotype of either 
the feudal oppressor or the running dog of imperialism. Wu originally recruited braves to defend 
the city against the Taiping; then his hired militiamen from Fujian and Guangdong deserted to 
join the Triads outside the city. Wu aimed to buy ships and weapons to aid the imperial siege of 
the city while he hid out with his American business partners. Both Liu Lichuan and Wu 
Jianzhang could communicate adequately in English with the foreigners, and both tried to secure 
foreign arms. Wu probably would have accepted the surrender of Liu, his compatriot, if the other 
rebel leaders had gone along. Militia groups recruited by local gentry and officials, since time 
immemorial, have switched sides for their own benefit. Officials in the Ming and Qing always 
preferred to buy off troublesome gangs than to track down and defeat them. Ming officials like 
the great general Qi Jiguang, who bought off pirate groups to defeat the wokou attacks of the 
sixteenth century, would have understood Wu’s dilemma perfectly. 
 
Cantonese Face the Wrath of Beijing 
           Aside from the actions of these two individuals, Cantonese regionalism influenced both 
the imperial and rebel operations. Wu raised funds from guild merchants in Shanghai who came 
from his hometown, while Liu recruited braves from Cantonese villages. Foreign observers 
blamed Wu for the “Cantonization” of the Shanghai trading system in the early 1850s. As they 
saw it, Wu and his colleagues reintroduced the corrupt practices of the monopoly trade of Canton 
into Shanghai, frustrating Western efforts to conduct free trade. But just as important as the 
action of officials was the influx of Cantonese dockworkers and sailors at the time. Shanghai 
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acquired its foreign networks through two routes: directly, from foreign residents of the city, and 
indirectly, via the Cantonese connection of hong merchants, workers, and seamen. Both Wu and 
Liu relied on their influence among Cantonese to bolster their influence in the city.  
 Wu’s Cantonese roots, however, also damaged his reputation in the eyes of the court in 
Beijing. His indictment in July 1854 charged him with “improper communication with foreigners 
and support of rebels” (tongyi yangzei 通易洋贼). It claimed that he had done improper business 
with the American firm Russell and Company had diverted customs revenues for his own profit 
and sent them back to his hometown, and had supported the Small Swords rebels because Liu 
Lichuan came from his hometown. 
 Now the very traits that had made Wu useful to the court earlier—his knowledge of 
English, his business acumen, and his ability to mobilize militia—were turned against him. His 
accusers argued that he used his intimate acquaintance with foreigners not to keep them out of 
the China trade, but to go into business with them for his own benefit. He had not collected 
customs revenues for defense purposes, but to line his own pockets. He recruited militiamen and 
bought ships for a defense fleet, but the militiamen became rebels, and Wu diverted funds from 
the yamen treasury to support the rebels. He gained the funds not from his private resources, but 
from illegally diverting customs revenues. The censor who impeached him concluded 
passionately: “We must have an upright official, either a neighboring provincial official or the 
governor-general, strictly investigate, to ensure that this evil traitor who colludes with foreigners 
does not escape justice” (Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 8.17a). 
 The emperor ordered Jiangsu governor Huang Zonghan to investigate the charges. Huang 
sent deputies to interrogate Wu and all the relevant parties, and he also consulted with gentry 
merchants in Zhejiang and Shanghai. In the end, he confirmed some of the charges, but he was 
unable to get reliable evidence on many others. Wu had done business with Liu and had recruited 
his militiamen, but the yamen treasury funds were stolen by Liu’s men, not diverted into Wu’s 
pockets. Wu had done business with the American firm, but so had many other merchant 
officials. Wu allowed American ships carrying sheets of lead to sail into Shanghai, but the 
investigator could not tell whether the lead was used for bullets or tea chests. He could not prove 
Wu’s embezzlement of customs funds, since he could not get access to the yamen books after the 
recapture of the city (Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 10.27). What did look suspicious, however, 
  Perdue  73   
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 25 (December 2017) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-25) 
 
was the fact that nearly all the sailors in the imperial fleet besieging the city were Cantonese. The 
investigator presumed that they could secretly contact the Cantonese rebels within the walled 
city to tip them off to upcoming attacks. Wu suffered guilt by association with his fellow 
Cantonese. 
 Was Wu a bandit or the innocent victim of a witch-hunt? Probably both. No one could 
prove that he personally profited from the Small Swords rebellion. In the end, the court was 
unable to discover exactly how much cash had been in the yamen and where it had gone. Wu 
might have portrayed himself as a helpless victim of his own militiamen, who turned against him 
for profit; on the other hand, his suspicious contacts with the Cantonese in Shanghai made him 
look like an unreliable outsider.  
 
The Daotai: A Hinge on the Open Door 
 Wu’s position as daotai made him the Qing official on the spot during this crisis. 
Historian Yuan-sang Leung describes the Shanghai daotai as a key “linkage man” facilitating 
relations between the Qing and foreign powers. These linkage positions connected two separate 
worlds or value systems, facilitating interaction between them (Leung 1990). Instead of viewing 
the Qing bureaucracy as a rigid institution resistant to change, Leung cites the daotai position as 
an example of its adaptability to new global trends.  
 The circuit intendants stayed in their post only a short time, and they were not 
conspicuous in official biographies.2 But they had much more influence on day-to-day practice in 
the treaty ports than their supervising officials. Wu himself stood out among daotai for his 
knowledge of English, and perhaps also some Portuguese; even knowing a little broken English 
put him ahead of all Chinese officials in Shanghai. Just as the daotai post itself expanded its 
responsibilities during the late nineteenth century, demonstrating the flexibility of the Qing 
bureaucracy, the men who occupied the position also exhibited adaptability, shifting their 
alliances and interests in response to changes in the world around them.  
 But the man in the middle never sits comfortably. One person’s “flexibility and 
adaptability” is another person’s opportunism and duplicity. Wu Jianzhang earned all sorts of 
epithets during the brief rise and fall of his career, both from contemporaries and from later 
historians. The moralistic tone has somehow never quite vanished, even today. Greed, 
opportunism, scheming, ruthlessness, hypocrisy, and deception are constant themes in the 
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evaluations of Wu by foreign consuls, the Qing court, and Western and PRC historians alike. 
Does he ever get credit for being cosmopolitan, adaptable, open-minded, or vulnerable? By 
examining more objectively the position of Wu and other figures like him, we can learn more 
about the structure of commercial relations along the Chinese coast from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth centuries. 
 
Predecessors and Legacies 
 Wu Jianzhang and the men in his network linking the worlds of China and the West did 
not appear de novo in the nineteenth century. They had an illustrious ancestry stretching back at 
least to the late Ming dynasty. In the late sixteenth century, defying the Ming prohibition on 
coastal trade, maritime confederations reaching from Japan to Southeast Asia employed coastal 
Chinese and others in large-scale trading enterprises. Ming officials denounced them as “dwarf 
[i.e., Japanese] pirates” (wokou 倭寇), but, in fact, the majority of these armed traders were 
Chinese (So 1975). Ming officials opposed to maritime trade knew well that the coastal fleets 
had close connections with resident Chinese on land. These smugglers needed warehouses to 
store goods, sources of capital, and distribution networks to the interior. Enraged Ming officials 
singled out the evil gentry known as “harboring hosts” (wozhu 窝主) as the chief source of social 
decay in the southeast. 
 
Lin Xiyuan: Gentry Pirate 
 These local gentry enthusiastically promoted maritime trade with all comers. They gained 
respect by bringing prosperity to their local communities and by establishing vital contacts with 
foreign traders. One of the most conspicuous of these harboring hosts was Lin Xiyuan (ca. 1480–
ca. 1560). Born in Tong’an, Fujian, Lin obtained his jinshi degree in 1517 and became an 
important official serving in Nanjing. He came from a hereditary military family, so he was able 
to use his privileged status to accumulate not only official position but local power (Szonyi 
2017). When he was demoted to the remote post of a subprefectural magistrate on the border of 
Guangdong and Annam, he developed a great interest in affairs on the southern border (Goodrich 
and Fang 1976, 919; Perdue 2015). After actively arguing for an attack on Vietnam when the 
Mac family usurped the throne, he was dismissed from office for his overly aggressive 
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intervention in Vietnamese affairs. He then retired to Xiamen, where he took up illegal overseas 
trade. Acting as a wozhu, he imported goods from maritime smugglers and sold them on 
commission in his local area. He was able to build a fleet of ships, invest capital in ocean 
voyages, lend money at interest, and accumulate a large income. When the Portuguese arrived on 
the southeast coast in the 1550s, he argued for opening trade with them, stressing the value of 
their goods. Lin’s promotion of the opening of trade with the Portuguese, along with changes in 
court policy, finally led to the award of a lease on Macau to the Portuguese in 1557. Despite 
repeated denunciations by Ming officials, Lin maintained great local influence as a local 
strongman  (tuhao 土豪) and earned ritual celebration in the local temple. 
 His greatest enemy was Zhu Wan (1494–1550), governor of Zhejiang, who was also 
responsible for policing the Fujian coast against pirate attacks (Goodrich and Fang 1976, 372–
375; Higgins 1981). Zhu discovered that many local gentry in Zhejiang and Fujian were 
financing illegal trade, collecting goods for distribution at the island of Shuangyugang near 
Ningbo. He attacked and destroyed the outpost at Shuangyugang, but he aroused so much local 
resentment that he generated enemies in the Ming court. They attacked Zhu and had him 
dismissed from office. He committed suicide while under investigation. Lin Xiyuan and his 
allies, with their patronage networks in Beijing, had warded off a state effort to reduce their 
influence.  
 Unlike Wu Jianzhang, Lin Xiyuan held no official post after his retirement. But he strung 
together official patrons in Beijing, creditors, merchants, sailors, braves, and international 
investors in a tightly woven web of relationships that could protect him from outside 
intervention. He and his ilk pioneered the commercial contacts that linked China to the global 
economy after the sixteenth century. When the Spanish took Manila, and the Portuguese held 
Macau, silver from the New World poured into China through the hands of Chinese merchants, 
mainly Fujian residents in Manila with connections on the mainland (Gebhardt 2015). Lin, like 
Wu, occupied the awkward middleman position, under pressure from all sides, but he survived 
because he had stronger local roots. Wu, a Cantonese who drifted to Shanghai, had to stretch his 
connections further, making them weaker and more vulnerable than Lin, who focused on the 
Fujian–Macau–Manila trade route.  
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Wu Tingfang: Barrister Rebel  
 Later in the nineteenth century, a small group of Chinese educated in the West further 
extended the cross-cultural networks developed by Lin and Wu. For example, Wu Tingfang 
(1842–1922), a leading figure in Hong Kong and national politics in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, found himself stretched between the forces of British colonialism, Chinese 
nationalism, and global commerce in much the same way as his predecessors (Wu 1914; 
Pomerantz-Zhang 1992). Born in Singapore to a merchant family, he grew up in Hong Kong and 
was educated in missionary schools. He then enrolled at Lincoln’s Inn to become a barrister, the 
first Chinese to practice in Hong Kong, and the first to become a member of Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council. In the words of his biographer, Linda Pomerantz-Zhang, “As the first 
Chinese barrister in Hong Kong, Wu was the ideal person to serve as go-between for the Chinese 
with their colonial administration” (1992, 47). 
 Wu Tingfang supported efforts by the Hong Kong colonial governor Sir John Pope 
Hennessy to introduce reforms in colonial administration that would give more influence to the 
Chinese residents. As Chinese merchants gained more wealth in the colony, they organized their 
own association, the Tung Wah Hospital Committee, to represent their interests. Wu could span 
both sides of the vast racial divide between British and Chinese because he had close family 
connections with the Hong Kong mercantile elite and high status as a barrister among the British 
elite as well. He insisted that leading Chinese be consulted on all major matters of colonial 
practice.  
 This outspoken activity generated hostility from the British Colonial Office, but 
Hennessy supported him. For example, Hennessy agreed with Wu’s proposal to restrain the use 
of flogging as punishment for Chinese criminals, but the Colonial Office rebuked Hennessy for 
endangering British residents. In a famous incident, in 1878, Wu led a group of prominent 
Chinese to attend a public meeting discussing “lawlessness” in the colony, arousing intense 
opposition from British who tried to exclude them (Pomerantz-Zhang 1992, 51ff). They accused 
Wu of leading “cutthroats and desperadoes” to pressure the authorities. But Wu responded that 
the Chinese had every right to attend the meeting. Hennessy allied with Wu and the Chinese 
community against the Colonial Office and British residents and appointed Wu to the Legislative 
Council, in the teeth of opposition by the local British community. Hennessy’s departure in 
1882, however, accompanied by a panic and crash in the Chinese commercial community, left 
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Wu stranded. He also lost money from his investments. In October 1882, he left Hong Kong and 
took a position under Li Hongzhang in Tianjin, ending his disappointing Hong Kong career. 
 Pomerantz-Zhang calls Wu part of a “new social group,” the “colonial intelligentsia,” 
who rose within the British colonial system while maintaining ties to local Chinese communities. 
But Wu’s rise and fall in Hong Kong strangely parallels the arc of Wu Jianzhang under different 
circumstances. Both men learned from their Cantonese experience how to appeal to foreigners’ 
concepts of status, learning English and becoming knowledgeable in commercial affairs. Both 
entered government service to protect the interests of Chinese communities. They promoted 
cooperation, while fostering increasing commercial power of the Chinese merchant class. They 
succeeded for a while, but ultimately ran up against implacable opposition from government 
circles who regarded them with suspicion. Wu Jianzhang faced a hostile Qing court, while Wu 
Tingfang faced a hostile Colonial Office, but the underlying ideologies of both governments 
resembled each other. The Qing court and the British, suspicious of Han Chinese ethnic 
difference, demanded complete loyalty, which neither man could offer.  
 The careers of the three men, however, did not end after their dismissal from office. They 
all found new opportunities after departing their middleman positions. Wu Jianzhang’s career 
after his return to Shanghai is obscure, but we know that he remained a prominent person in the 
city until at least 1860. He remained influential in the Shanghai region for some time after his 
impeachment, but he kept well below the radar of both the foreign and Qing officials. Lin 
Xiyuan made himself into a local power holder in the face of Ming suppression. By confining 
himself to local affairs, he avoided challenging the state itself, while consolidating his wealth and 
status in his community. Wu Tingfang went on to a much more glorious career, as adviser to Li 
Hongzhang and then minister to the United States, Spain, and Peru. He intervened with both the 
Qing and Americans during the Boxer expedition and associated himself with Yuan Shikai after 
the Republican Revolution before his retirement.  
 Each of these three men negotiated their careers in times of critical confrontation between 
China and the West. The similarities in their conduct and in perceptions of them indicate a 
pattern of interactions along the China coast in which these middlemen linked foreign and 
domestic officials, merchants, and lower classes. Yet they also had distinct experiences because 
of the changing times. Over time, the intermediaries increased their knowledge about Western 
societies. Lin Xiyuan knew about the Portuguese only indirectly, while Wu Jianzhang had met 
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some Portuguese, British, and Americans and learned some foreign languages, and Wu Tingfang 
had fully assimilated himself to the British ruling elite on its own terms. They also increased 
their international impact as members of the official class. Lin Xiyuan mainly stood out as a 
local eminent person, while Wu Jianzhang maintained a variety of contacts in Shanghai; Wu 
Tingfang gained a truly international reputation. Each suffered attacks and disgrace, and each 
had financial gains and losses determined by their foreign investments. Each of them, as far as 
we know, also had links to Chinese lower classes. In Wu Jianzhang’s case, we know the name of 
his main collaborator, Liu Lichuan, but Lin Xiyuan, as a harboring host, also clearly depended 
on a network of local traders, porters, and smugglers to distribute his goods. Wu Tingfang gained 
support from the Hong Kong mercantile community, as well as some of the local British. Despite 
their different statuses, however, all three men served as intermediaries between the Chinese 
state and foreign rulers, and they were pulled in different directions by regional loyalties, official 
obligations, cultural tendencies, and personal interest. 
 In the end, none of these men fully achieved his goals. But their example alerts us to the 
existence of Chinese who adroitly maneuvered between the Scylla of Westernization and the 
Charybdis of nativism during China’s troubled times. Were they wily opportunists, astute go-
betweens, proto-globalizers, or traitors to the Han? People who play multiple roles never fit into 
neat pigeonholes.  
 
Interlopers in Global History  
 What can the cases of Wu Jianzhang, Lin Xiyuan, Wu Tingfang, and others tell us about 
the formation of the globally connected world in the modern era? Quite a few scholars have 
argued that we need to look beyond the boundaries of contemporary Asian states in order to 
grasp the dynamics of globalization, past and present (Wigen 1999; Wigen and Lewis 1999; 
Ludden 2003; Tagliacozzo, Perdue, and Siu 2015a, 2015b). This new wave of scholarship 
examines processes, places, people, and commodities that cross the boundaries of nation-states 
and empire, and it aims to reconceive traditional spatial divisions of Asia with new concepts such 
as the Southeast Asian Mediterranean, Zomia, seas, or archipelagoes (Reid 1988; Wong 2004; 
Scott 2009; Amrith 2013). 
 Proponents of transnational history also argue for the study of actors and institutions that 
cross national boundaries. As mentioned above, biographies of individuals who traveled the 
  Perdue  79   
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 25 (December 2017) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-25) 
 
world can illuminate global processes effectively. So far, however, most transnational history 
concentrates on the twentieth-century United States and Europe. Only a few Asian historians 
have gone deeply into the study of transnational history for earlier periods, but their number is 
growing (Benedict 2011; Perdue 2017; Tagliacozzo and Chang 2011). Environmental historians 
and frontier historians, for example, have looked at borderlands and the populations on both 
sides. But we still need new studies of the relationships between Chinese and foreigners, even in 
the classic areas of contact along the Chinese coast.  
 The lineage of modern historical study of China founded by John K. Fairbank may find 
new relevance in the era of transnational history and globalization. Fairbank and his students 
pioneered the study of Chinese foreign relations based on Chinese-language documents 
alongside British and American archival materials. Unlike earlier scholars such as H. B. Morse, 
Fairbank used newly published Chinese archival documents to closely examine the actions of 
both Chinese and British officials together. In Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (1969), 
he analyzed how British, Americans, and Chinese officials together reformulated trading 
relations in the wake of the First Opium War. Key actors on the China side included the 
governors, circuit intendants, merchants, smugglers, and rebels in the Shanghai area. 
 Fairbank also described Wu Jianzhang’s contribution to the new system of customs duties 
collection in Shanghai. As he put it, “The Foreign Inspectorate might not have been created if 
[Wu Jianzhang] had not been capable of the most unscrupulous knavery” (Fairbank 1969, 439). 
Fairbank describes Wu as “duplicitous,” a “wily rogue who had grown up in the Canton trade 
rather than with the Confucian classics” (Fairbank 1978, 242). In Fairbank’s view, Wu made 
profits for himself and others out of his supervision of the foreign trade, but he also created new 
methods of levying duties under the treaties. Fairbank also describes Wu as the first of the treaty 
port merchants to take advantage of their position in between the foreign powers and Chinese 
consumers to raise both their economic and political positions. Wu laid the groundwork for the 
rise of the comprador class of merchants who dominated treaty port trade in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. 
 So, even though most of Fairbank’s analysis focused on the British consuls and military 
representatives, as well as top-level Qing officials, he also provided intriguing sketches of some 
lower-level officials. Some of the best recent works on the transnational history of East Asia 
have specifically highlighted the role of these less prominent but still critical people (Bickers 
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2003; Uchida 2011; Khan 2015). In this sense, Fairbank pointed the way to developing one of 
the main themes emphasized by the new transnational history: the study of “mid-level” actors 
who shaped foreign and commercial relations (Iriye 2013; Saunier 2013). 
 To be sure, Fairbank’s perspective, with its focus on “China’s response to the West,” 
came under critique for being too one-sided and too elitist. It mainly emphasized high-level 
Chinese officials and intellectuals who encountered Western diplomats and traders at the treaty 
ports. The social history turn of the 1980s focused attention more closely on the rural roots of 
rebellion, tending to stress domestic sources of rebellion. The case of the Small Swords, 
however, shows that rebels in regions like Jiangnan had significant ties with foreign agents. Now 
it is time to link the contributions of social history, with its stress on the local, to our revived 
recognition of the role of the global and transnational in directing modern Chinese history.  
 What did it take to succeed in these bewildering times and places? Men who adroitly 
managed this precarious balancing act needed the support of a three-legged stool: connections to 
officialdom, links to foreign patrons, and roots in local society. Certain global moments allowed 
them to rise to positions of importance, but the force field that supported them could shift at any 
moment. No single leg was stable by itself, and the three supports held each other in tension. 
Higher officials might at one time endorse, or at least tolerate, foreign contacts, but they could 
easily turn against slick negotiators tainted by foreign influence. The useful intermediary could 
turn into a traitor at a moment’s notice. Local people might profit from the brokers who gave 
them useful links to the bureaucracy and foreign trade, but they could just as easily strike out on 
their own, pursuing their interests through anti-official collective action or underground 
smuggling. Foreigners found these people useful, but baffling, and they never really shook off 
racial prejudices against Chinese who took on foreign ways. Yet, time and again, ambitious, 
multitalented Chinese men, and later women, have undertaken to connect local Chinese with 
higher officialdom and the equally promising but dangerous maritime world. They deserve our 
respect, insight, and careful study.  
 
Peter C. Perdue is professor of History at Yale University. The author presented versions of this 
article at the “Binding Maritime China: Control, Evasion, and Interloping” conference at 
Boston University; the British Association for Chinese Studies annual meeting; a workshop on 
the Qing and the early modern world at Johns Hopkins University; and a University of 
Pennsylvania China workshop. He is grateful to all of the participants for their comments. 
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Notes 
 
1 Many scholars have studied the foreign and hong merchants in Canton, but we have little 
information on those who moved to Shanghai. Major works on the Canton trade include 
Cheong (1997), Downs (1997), and Van Dyke (2005, 2011, 2016.) 
2 The Harvard China Biographical Database Project of 360,000 biographies contains only 
one short entry about Wu Jianzhang 
(http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k16229). 
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